Introduction
Middle-and upper-class parents often think that a school system in which students from different socio-economic backgrounds and with different ability levels learn together in the same schools would harm their children, because teachers might need to slow down instruction or because the school climate and motivation might worsen. A school system in which students from different social backgrounds and with different abilities attend separate schools, on the other hand, can create disadvantageous school environments with lower expectations, motivation, and teaching quality for low-performing or socio-economically disadvantaged students. This chapter examines whether there is such a trade-off: is an integrated school system good for both socio-economically disadvantaged and low-achieving students, whereas it hampers both socio-economically advantaged and highachieving students? I try to answer this question by making both a conceptual and a methodological contribution to the literature on differentiation in secondary education and its consequences for educational achievement. Conceptually, I broaden the perspective on differentiation in education that often focuses only on formal external tracking. Besides tracking, there are also more 'hidden' forms of differentiation that contribute to segregating schools in terms of socio-economic background and ability. I argue that especially in an international comparison, it is important to take into account that there might be other mechanisms than tracking that lead to a separation of students in terms of socio-economic background and ability and enlarge inequalities in school quality. Therefore, I use the social segregation of schools -defined as the extent to which students from different social backgrounds attend separate schools -as a measure of differentiation in secondary education.
In addition to broadening the concept of differentiation, this chapter attempts to make a methodological contribution. In the literature, questions about the effects of educational differentiation are often addressed by comparing countries with early tracking to those with later tracking (Horn 2009; Le Donné 2014) . This comparison is problematic if early tracking is related to unobserved characteristics. In this case, it is not clear whether students from disadvantaged families perform worse in countries with early selection because tracking creates unfavourable learning environments in lower tracks, or because disadvantaged families provide more disadvantageous learning environments than in other countries -for instance in terms of overlap with other dimensions of social inequality such as migration background, neighbourhood conditions, or single parenthood. To the extent that these unobserved country differences remain constant, I cope with this problem by analysing changes within countries over time using PISA data from five waves. When schools become more integrated by socio-economic status, how does this affect different groups of students?
The chapter is structured as follows: I explain the concept of formal and 'hidden' differentiation in secondary education, discuss why less differentiation might promote disadvantaged children without affecting advantaged students, and outline methodological problems. Afterwards, I explain the research design and present the results.
Formal and 'Hidden' Differentiation in Secondary Education
Whether students with varying socio-economic backgrounds and abilities are taught together in the same schools or attend different schools varies between education systems. This is due to variations in formal differentiation, on the one hand, and 'hidden' differentiation, on the other. The comparative literature on the effects of differentiation in secondary education focuses largely on formal differentiation. Formal differentiation means that students are separated into different school types or tracks/programmes at some point in their school career. The intention behind is to homogenize the student body so that teachers can tailor their instruction to fit students' needs and interests. But because performance, interests, and aspirations are influenced by families, tracking strengthens the social segregation between schools.
However, by focusing only on formal differentiation, one misses more 'hidden' forms of differentiation. Even in comprehensive education systems, middle-and upper-class parents find ways to differentiate their children from others and to ensure that they attend high-quality schools. In some countries parents are free to choose their children's school, reinforcing school segregation because school choices vary by socio-economic background. And also schools may select students. Nonetheless, even when children are required to attend the school within their district, children from varying family backgrounds attend different schools to the extent that there is residential segregation (Burgess and Briggs 2010) . To sum up, formal and informal differentiation in secondary education entail that students from varying social backgrounds and with varying abilities attend different schools. To capture both formal and hidden differentiation in education, I use the extent of schools' social segregation in a country defined as the extent to which students from varying social backgrounds attend separate schools (see section 5).
Formal differentiation is intended to separate students by ability, creating academically homogeneous groups. That means that performance variance is high between schools, but low within schools. I do not use this indicator of ability differentiation between schools, because changes in variance between schools are not independent of changes in my dependent variable, which is changes in the performance of different groups of students. However, socio-economic and ability differentiation are positively related (see appendix, Figure A1 ). In general, in the early-tracking countries, not only children with varying performance levels but also children from different socioeconomic backgrounds attend separate schools. Therefore, indicators of both formal differentiation -such as the age at the first selection -and informal differentiation -such as the socio-economic segregation among schools -would classify these education systems as unequal (appendix, Figure  A2 ). However, there are also countries without early selection such as the United States that are nonetheless characterized by a high socio-economic segregation among schools. Thus, even though both Finland and the United States separate students only at the age of 16, the Nordic countries have the most socially inclusive education systems, whereas the United States' education system is one of the most socially segregated. These differences cannot be captured with an indicator of formal differentiation, which is why I use the socio-economic segregation among schools as my indicator of an education system's informal differentiation.
Why less differentiation might boost disadvantaged students' performance without harming advantaged students
Why might an education system's socio-economic segregation matter for students' performance? The concentration of socio-economically disadvantaged students creates disadvantaged schools in terms of peers, teachers, and instruction. Peer effects might lead to a worse school climate and motivation and influence the quality of instruction. In schools with more students from disadvantaged families and seemingly lower ability, teachers tend to have lower expectations and slow down the pace of instruction. Schools with many students who are perceived to be difficult have problems attracting good teachers (Gamoran and Berends 1987) . When schools are perceived to be of low quality and have problems attracting good teachers, parents with high educational aspirations will try to avoid them. This reinforces the concentration of disadvantaged students in these schools. Because differentiation in terms of socio-economic background traps students from disadvantaged families in disadvantageous schools (Oakes 1985; Gamoran and Berends 1987; Bifulco et al. 2008) , I expect that students from disadvantaged families will perform worse in socially segregated education systems (Hypothesis 1).
The advocates of more differentiation fear that high-performing students and those from socioeconomically advantaged families are hampered if they are taught together with students from disadvantaged families who tend to perform worse at school (Hoxby 2003) . For example, most parents in Germany believe that it is better for good students to be taught together with other good students (Süßlin 2013) . Taking these positions together, there might be a trade-off between the promotion of high-performing and socio-economically advantaged students on the one side, and low-performing and socio-economically disadvantaged students on the other side.
Against the view of a trade-off, however, there are arguments why students from disadvantaged families would benefit from an inclusive school system, whereas students from advantaged families would not lose: good learning opportunities at school might be especially important for students from lower socio-economic groups and migrants because they could potentially compensate for less stimulation and support in families (Coleman 1966; Alexander et al. 2001) . Socio-economically advantaged students, on the other hand, might succeed anyway, either because their parents are able to compensate for a bad school, or because school quality does not deteriorate even when the student body becomes more mixed. School quality might not suffer either because advantaged parents hold teachers responsible for their teaching or because more advanced students can gain a deeper understanding while explaining something to less advanced students and thereby benefit from an enriched classroom discussion including more diverse perspectives. To sum up, children from privileged families might not be harmed by an integrated education system but will succeed anyway.
Building on these arguments, my hypothesis is that there is no trade-off between the performance of students from different social backgrounds and with different abilities: When an education system becomes more integrated by socio-economic background, socio-economically disadvantaged and low-performing students will benefit (Hypothesis 1), whereas there will be no consistent negative effect for students from socio-economically advantaged families or for high performers (Hypothesis 2). Thus, the argument is that there is no trade-off between equality of opportunity and excellence in education.
Literature and methodological challenges
There are two main methodological approaches to analysing the effect of differentiation on students' performance. One is to compare countries with different education systems and the second is to evaluate institutional reforms. Conceptually, both approaches focus on formal differentiation only, leaving aside more 'hidden' forms of differentiation.
Exploiting institutional differences between school systems, the comparative literature shows that in early-tracking school systems the effect of social background on students' performance in PISA is stronger than in comprehensive school systems (Horn 2009; Van de Werfhorst and Mijs 2010) . This comes without an advantage in the average performance level, because students from disadvantaged families perform better in countries with a later age of selection, whereas students from advantaged families perform similarly in countries with early and late selection (Horn 2009; Van de Werfhorst and Mijs 2010; Le Donné 2014) . Thus, the comparative literature finds no trade-off between equality of opportunity and excellence.
Conceptually, the comparative literature focuses on formal differentiation, using as indicators the age of the first selection in an education system and the number of different tracks available. Le Donné (2014) broadens the perspective by including the amount of selective schools and private schools with fees. Nonetheless, school differentiation due to residential segregation cannot be captured with these variables.
One methodological challenge is that educational differentiation might be interwoven with unobserved societal characteristics such as socioeconomic inequality or ethnic diversity. Therefore, achievement gaps may already be larger in early tracking countries before they separate students into different tracks. To cope with this problem, Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) use a 'difference-in-difference' approach. They compare how inequality of outcomes develops from the end of primary school to the end of lower secondary school in countries that track students in-between these time points and in countries that do not. Using TIMSS and PIRLS data for 4th graders and PISA data for 15-year-old students, they find that early tracking increases educational inequality, because low-performing students are left behind. But they state that 'in no case do some students gain at the expense of others' (Hanushek and Woessmann 2006: 74) .
The advantage of the difference-in-difference approach is that unobserved differences between countries do not influence the analysis as long as they remain constant. What is crucial in order to identify changes within countries is a comparable sample across the two points in time. Because PIRLS and TIMSS sample by grade whereas PISA samples by age, Jakubowski (2010) argues that this is not the case. Van de Werfhorst (2013) analyses students' performance in several countries before and after detracking reforms and compares them to developments in countries in which no such reform took place. He finds that the education systems that became comprehensive experienced a stronger reduction in educational inequality compared to the others. However, although he tracks changes over a long period of time from 1964 to 1980, he cannot test the assumption that, without the reforms, countries that transformed their education system would have developed in the same way as countries that did not. This is a strong assumption because there are reasons why some countries moved from a tracked towards an untracked education system whereas others did not. Thus, comparative research might tend to overestimate the effect of tracking because it does not take into account unobserved differences between tracking and non-tracking countries.
Instead of exploiting the institutional variation between countries, another possibility is to analyse the effect of de-tracking education reforms within single countries. Jakubowski et al. (2010) evaluate a Polish school reform postponing tracking by one year and Kerr et al. (2013) evaluate the Finnish comprehensive school reform from the 1970s postponing selection by five years. Using the gradual implementation of the school reform, Kerr et al.'s difference-in-difference estimates reveal that sons with low-educated parents improved due to the school reform. The effect size is remarkable, corresponding to one-quarter of the effect size of parental education. Even more remarkably, the reform had no negative effects on test scores of students from families with higher education, even though the age of selection was postponed by five years.
To sum up, most studies find that de-tracking has positive effects for low-performing students and those from disadvantaged families, whereas there is no effect on students from advantaged families and high performers. Conceptually, the literature on the effects of differentiation in secondary education is restricted to formal differentiation. Methodologically, the literature might overestimate the effect of tracking when intertwined societal characteristics are not controlled. To cope with both, I analyse the relation between changes in schools' social segregation and students' performance within countries over cohorts.
Research design, data, and variables

Dependent Variables: Changes in Test Scores
To investigate the effects of schools' socio-economic segregation on students' performance, I use students' test scores in the PISA reading assessment as dependent variables (appendix , Table A2 ).
PISA assesses students' capacity to apply knowledge to real-life settings, to analyse, reason, and solve problems. The PISA studies have been carried out every three years since 2000. In each round, one of the subjects was the main assessment area, starting with reading. Therefore, test results can be compared directly over time following the year in which a subject has been the main assessment area. Hence, reading scores can be compared over all waves; mathematics, from 2003 onwards; and science, from 2006 onwards. I shall focus on reading, although results for mathematics are very similar. The mean score in the first PISA round within OECD countries is 500 and the standard deviation is 100. To be better able to interpret the scores, the OECD estimates that about 40 points on the PISA scale correspond to the learning progress made by students within one school year (OECD 2013).
To analyse the effects of changes in social segregation on high-and low-performing children, I use the percentage of a country's 'low performers' and 'top performers' (appendix, Table A2 ). Top performers achieve proficiency level 5 or higher, being able to understand texts about unusual topics, apply their knowledge to new situations, and formulate and reflect on their own opinion. Low performers do not achieve proficiency level 2, because they are unable to summarize the main ideas of a text (OECD 2010).
Independent Variables
To measure students' socio-economic background, I use the Economic Social and Cultural Status (ESCS) provided by the OECD (appendix , Table A3 ). This index is composed of three components: one for parents' highest educational attainment, one for their highest occupational prestige, and one relating to affluence and cultural goods. To make it comparable over time, the OECD provides rescaled indices of the ESCS on the 2012 scale that I have merged to every dataset. In my sample, the median ESCS corresponds to zero; the 10th percentile, to -1.3; and the 90th percentile, to 1.2.
To capture a country's socio-economic segregation among schools, I measure how much of the ESCS variance lies among schools. The estimate comes from a multilevel analysis in which the ESCS as dependent variable is clustered within schools. The intra-class correlation multiplied by 100 expresses the proportion of variance in social background explained by schools. In Finland, as the most equal school system, only about 8 per cent of the variance in ESCS lies between schools, whereas in Hungary, as the most socially segregated school system, this value amounts to 38 per cent (appendix , Table A1 ).
Because I want to compare the index of social segregation among schools over time, it is crucial that the definition of schools does not change. There is no common definition of schools across countries, because schools in PISA serve primarily as sampling units. For example, in Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Romania, and Slovenia, study programmes within schools are treated as schools. In Italy, schools are defined as administrative units that might be located on different campuses; whereas in other countries, schools are defined by school buildings or by school principals (OECD 2013) . Although the differences in definitions are a problem, this is less severe because I am using only changes within countries. The crucial aspect for the present approach is that the definition of schools within countries does not change over time. There is no indication of any change in the definition of schools in any of the Technical Reports. Another problem when comparing the index of social segregation over time arises from changes in the stratification variables used to sample schools. Therefore, when calculating the socio-economic segregation, I weight the data with the final student weights at the student level and with the sum of students' weights within a school at the school level.
Research Strategy and Models
To cope with the problem that tracking might be intertwined with unobserved societal characteristics, I shall look at changes within countries using five waves of PISA data. Therefore, I run country-fixed-effects models with the advantage of controlling for all differences remaining constant over time. To analyse only changes within countries, I take each variable and subtract its respective country mean over all waves. Because the socio-economic conditions in which children grow up can also change over time within a country, I control for within-country changes in the average and the standard deviation of the ESCS.
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The dependent variable is changes in students' reading performance. As independent variable, I include students' ESCS and schools' social segregation at the country level. In this model, the outcome of interest is the coefficient of school segregation capturing how changes in school segregation influence changes in countries' mean performance. In Model 2, I add a cross-level interaction of social segregation with students' ESCS to capture how changes in social segregation change the influence of parental background on students' performance.
To compare the effect across students from socio-economically advantaged and disadvantaged backgrounds, I graph the marginal effects of changes in schools' social segregation on students' performance. To analyse how changes in social segregation affect high-and low-performing students, I use the percentage of high and low performers in a country as alternative dependent variables.
Sample
I restrict the analyses to OECD and EU countries, excluding the OECD outliers Chile, Mexico, and Israel. This leaves me with 35 countries. Because I merge five waves for reading and four waves for mathematics, the sample includes more than one million students for reading and more than 900 000 students for mathematics who attend more than 40 000 schools.
Findings
How Students' Mathematics Performance Evolved Over Cohorts
Over the 12 years between PISA 2000 and 2012, the reading performance of socio-economically disadvantaged students in the bottom quartile of the ESCS improved most in Germany, Poland, Switzerland, and Latvia. With about 40 points, the improvement in Poland and Germany corresponds to students' progress within a whole school year. Socio-economically disadvantaged students performed worse a decade after the first PISA test in Sweden, Iceland, Finland, and New Zealand.
Interestingly, in two of the countries in which students from socio-economically disadvantaged families improved most, namely Poland and Latvia, students from better-off families also improved most over cohorts. Similarly, in Sweden, where the performance of students from low-ESCS families deteriorated most, high-ESCS students also lost out. Only in the United States and France are there indications that one group lost out whereas the other gained. The positive correlation between changes in the top and the bottom quartile of the ESCS corresponds to 0.62. Thus, Figure 1 reveals that there is no trade-off between the performance developments of students from different social backgrounds: they seem to be all in the same boat. 
How the Schools' Social Segregation Evolved Over Time
Whereas formal differentiation changed only in Poland over the period covered by PISA studies, social segregation among schools changed in several countries. Schools became less socially segregated from the first to the last cohort observed in Turkey, Poland, Japan, Spain, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, whereas they became more socially segregated in Latvia, Bulgaria, Portugal, Austria, and Romania. The changes range from a 12 percentage point reduction in Turkey to a 12 percentage point increase in Latvia (appendix, Figure A4 ).
How Changes in the Social Segregation of Schools Relate to Equality and Excellence
Do changes in an education system's socio-economic segregation go hand in hand with changes in equality of opportunity? And if so, is increasing equality of opportunity brought about by decreases in excellence? To answer these questions, this section applies country-fixed-effects models using changes within countries between each wave, whereas the descriptive part gave an overview over changes from the first to the last cohort observed in PISA.
When the socio-economic segregation among schools increases, so does the influence of students' family background on performance (Table 1, Model 2). This is in line with my first hypothesis arguing that, for students from disadvantaged families, a more socially segregated school system means worse learning opportunities at school in addition to worse learning opportunities in families. When compared to the main effect of ESCS, however, the effect size is quite small: a student with a one standard deviation higher ESCS than her peers performs on average 38 points higher in the PISA reading test. This corresponds to what students learn within a whole school year. In comparison, a one percentage point reduction of social segregation from one wave to the next decreases the effect of the ESCS on students' performance by 0.59. Because the maximum changes in social segregation from 2000 to 2012 ranged approximately from -10 to +10 percentage points, the maximum effect would be to increase (or decrease) the effect of ESCS by about 6 points, corresponding to a 15 per cent increase (or decrease) in the effects of ESCS on performance.
Remarkably, gains in equality of opportunity are not brought about at the cost of excellence. In contrast, increases in the social segregation of an education system go hand in hand with decreases in students' average performance level (Table 1 , Model 1). When the social segregation of an education system increases by about 10 percentage points, the average reading performance decreases by about 9 points. Thus, increases in equality of opportunity do not mean losses in terms of performance. Note: All models are controlled for being foreign-born, having a foreign-born mother, or having a foreign-born father at the individual level; and for changes in the mean and the standard deviation of the ESCS at the country level. Source: OECD: 2000-12 PISA database.
Who Wins and Who Loses?
We have seen that a decreasing social segregation is associated with a decreasing influence of family background. But how does this come about? Do socio-economically disadvantaged students improve at the expense of better-off students? To answer this question, Figure 2 predicts how the changes in schools' social segregation affect students at the 90th, 75th, 50th, 25th, and 10th percentile of the ESCS distribution within their country. The figure reveals that socio-economically disadvantaged students are most affected by changes in the socio-economic segregation between schools. For students at the 10th percentile of the ESCS distribution, it makes a difference of 25 points on the PISA reading test whether they live in a country that experienced the highest increase in social segregation compared to a country that experienced the highest decrease in social segregation. This difference is statistically significant and corresponds to progress made within more than one-half of a school year. The effect is about one-half of that size for students at the median of the ESCS distribution. For students at the 90th percentile of the ESCS distribution, the effect is close to zero and statistically non-significant for both reading and mathematics: high-ESCS students perform well regardless of whether the education system becomes more integrated or not.
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Figure 2: Changes in schools' social segregation and in reading scores by ESCS percentiles
Is the same true for a possible trade-off between high-and low-performing students? I test this by using the percentage of students on the highest and the lowest performance levels as dependent variables. On average, a country has about seven to eight per cent top performers who are able to apply their knowledge to new situations and reflect on their solutions and opinion, and about 18 per cent low performers who are unable to summarize the main ideas of a text. When schools' segregation increases in a country, the change in top performers is close to zero, whereas the percentage of low performers increases (appendix , Table A6 ). To conclude, reduced social segregation between schools is not harmful for either socio-economically advantaged or highperforming students, whereas socio-economically disadvantaged and low-performing students benefit.
Conclusion and discussion
Do socio-economically advantaged students perform best in a differentiated education system whereas students from socio-economically disadvantaged families perform best in inclusive education systems? This chapter makes both a conceptual and a methodological contribution to this debate. In conceptual terms, I use a broad concept of differentiation, taking into account not only formal differentiation but also more 'hidden' forms of differentiation. Even in comprehensive education systems, schools can differ in terms of quality, and middle-and upper-class parents might find ways to differentiate their children from others. To capture not only formal but also hidden differentiation, I measure the social segregation among schools defined as the amount of ESCS variance between schools.
Methodologically, I contribute to the literature by analysing only changes within countries over time.
The advantage is that unobserved country factors such as ethnic diversity, socio-economic cleavages, or cultural values do not influence the results to the extent that they are time-constant. This is an advantage over the comparative studies using institutional variation between countries. Using five waves of PISA data from 2000 to 2012, I find that when an education system becomes more socially inclusive, this is beneficial for students from socio-economically disadvantaged families and decreases the percentage of students with poor skills. At the same time, students from betteroff families are not affected by changes in social segregation. They perform well anywhereindependent of whether they attend schools with students from socio-economically disadvantaged families or not. A country's proportion of top performers is not affected by changes in the social segregation between schools either. The findings indicate that there is no trade-off from promoting performance development in different groups of students. Instead, improving equality of opportunity, for example by making schools more socio-economically inclusive, promotes a higher average performance level without harming high-performing students.
One limitation of the analyses is that I am not able to identify the mechanisms behind the findings. For further research, it would be interesting to explore why students from socio-economically advantaged families perform well, relatively independent of the school system's social segregation. Another shortcoming is that I take into account only differentiation between schools but not differentiation within schools.
To conclude, contrary to the beliefs of many middle-and upper-class parents, school systems in which students from different socio-economic backgrounds learn together in the same schools do not harm middle-and upper-class children. These children perform well everywhere, independent of how socially inclusive the education system is. Socio-economically disadvantaged students, on the other hand, improve their reading and mathematics performance when school systems -tracked or comprehensive -become more socially inclusive. Thus, in tracked as well as in comprehensive school systems, it remains a challenge to provide equal opportunities by ensuring that schools do not become segregated by social background, thereby trapping disadvantaged students in disadvantaged schools. One of the main challenges in this enterprise may well still be to persuade middle-and upper-class parents that this will not harm their children -and the aim of this article is to contribute to this. The effect on top-performers is statistically significant but very close to zero (and negative if anything). With each percentage point increase in schools' social segregation, the percentage of top-performers decreases by 0.01 percentage points. As schools' social segregation maximally changes by less than 10%, the maximum change is less than 0.1 percentage points. The effect on low-performers, on the other hand, is more substantial with a change of 3 percentage points for the maximum change in schools' social segregation. 
